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ABSTRACT 
Party identification traditionally is seen as an important linkage mechanism, connecting voters to 
the party system. Previous analyses have suggested that the level of party identity is in decline in 
Germany, and in this article, we first expand previous observations with more recent data. These 
suggest that the erosion of party identity continues up to the present time. An age-period-cohort 
analysis of the panel data of the SOEP panel suggests that period effects are significantly 
negative. Furthermore, it can be observed that throughout the 1992-2009 observation period, 
education level and political interest have become more important determinants of party identity. 
Contrary to some of the literature, therefore, it can be shown that the loss of party identity is 
concentrated among groups with lower levels of political sophistication, indicating that the socio-
economic profile of the group with a sense of party identification has become more distinct 
compared to the population as a whole. In the discussion, we investigate the theoretical and 
democratic consequences of this trend. 
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1. Introduction 
Earlier research has demonstrated quite convincingly that the level of party identification in the former 
West Germany has steadily declined over the period 1977-2002.1 Especially the two main parties lost 
support, and given the literature on the relation between party identity and voter preference, it can easily 
be assumed that the decline of party identification is causally related to the perennial decline of the vote 
share of the two main parties in the German political system.2 While in 1994 Christian-Democrats and 
Socialists jointly obtained 77.9 per cent of the vote, this was down to 67.3 per cent in 2009. A possible 
explanation for this trend might be that the gradual decline of party identification described by Arzheimer, 
has accelerated since the turn of the century. It is important, therefore, to provide an update of the work by 
Arzheimer to introduce new evidence on the evolution of party identification in Germany. 
Understanding the dynamics of party identification, however, also requires that we can identify more 
exactly who develops or loses a party identity. Arzheimer’s conclusion was that the downward trend could 
be observed among all groups in society, without any major exceptions, but it has to be noted that for this 
observation he was dependent on repeated cross-sectional observations.3 Although this kind of data 
obviously provide very valuable insights, they are less suitable to detect long term trends, as ideally this 
requires panel data that allow us to track the same respondents over time. As is well-known, aggregate 
level trends do not necessarily inform us about individual trajectories during the life cycle. In this article, 
we present the results of such a panel analysis using the data of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP), with 258,225 observations for the period 1992-2009. The main advantage of this kind of analysis 
is that it allows us to determine in a more exact manner among which groups the assumed loss of party 
identity is concentrated during this period. The data also allow us to distinguish between age, period and 
cohort effects, a step that has not yet been taken in previous research. 
In this article, we first review the literature on the importance of party identification, before presenting 
more in detail our data and methods. We will present statistical evidence with regard to the trends in party 
identification. Which groups tend to identify with a party, and can we describe the influence of time on 
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party identification as age, period or cohort effects? Next, and building on previous work by Arzheimer, 
we use an autoregressive panel analysis to ascertain among which groups trends in party identification can 
be detected. We close with some observations on the current relevance of the concept of party 
identification to understand electoral behaviour in Germany. 
2. Literature 
a. Party Identification in Germany 
Party identification has been a central concept within the literature on voting behavior ever since the 
authors of The American Voter stressed its importance.4 The authors of this pioneering election study 
presented the vote choice process as a funnel of causality. Short-term factors as candidate images, election 
campaigns and issues were found to have an impact on the vote. Somewhat contrary to expectations, 
however, Campbell and his colleagues found partisanship to be by far the most important determinant of 
vote choice.5 The enormous number of publications referring to the concept and employing it to explain 
voting behavior offer evidence for the statement that party identification is “the most important concept in  
modern electoral behavior research”.6 The Michigan school scholars conceptualized partisanship as a 
psychological identification. The origins of partisanship were traced back to a period of political 
socialization early in the life cycle. Even before adolescents have a firm understanding of politics, they 
already acquire a party identification through a process of parental socialization.7 Furthermore, the role of 
peers and the school environment in the acquisition of party identification has been stressed by several 
scholars.8 Once acquired, partisan identity is conceived as remaining stable throughout life. Furthermore, 
partisanship is not only expected to have a strong impact on the vote choice, it is also seen as providing 
direction to political behavior and attitudes in general.9 
Although party identification is a central concept in voting behavior research, it is also much debated and 
discussed in the scholarly literature.10 Especially the assumed persistence and rigidity of partisanship has 
been criticized. During the 1970s several publications showed the responsiveness of partisanship to 
retrospective evaluations of government performance, to election campaigns and to politicians’ 
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personalities. Authors building on this idea disavowed the perception of partisanship as originating from a 
period of early socialization and its alleged stability.11 The description of stable partisanship that was 
given in The American Voter might have been accurate during that period of observation, they claimed. 
The apparent weakening of partisan attachments from the 1970s onwards, however, challenged the 
validity of their theoretical framework for the more recent period.12 Therefore the image of partisanship as 
an unmoved mover was contrasted with a discourse on declining partisanship. Besides the number of party 
identifiers, the importance of partisanship on the vote choice was also clearly in decline. Even for the 
considerably reduced group that still claimed to be a party identifier, partisanship was no longer a strong 
predictor for vote choices, so it was claimed.13 Increasing levels of electoral volatility, of split-ticket 
voting and of voters deciding ever later in the election campaign what party to vote for, then, are all 
attributed to this weakening of partisanship.14 
The concept of party identification has not only been challenged on conceptual and theoretical grounds, 
but also on empirical grounds. More specifically, the question has been raised whether population surveys 
are indeed a good mechanism to measure party identification in a reliable manner. It has been argued that 
respondents’ answers to questions about their partisanship are strongly influenced by short-term forces as 
candidate images and election campaigns. As a consequence there is a substantial measurement error 
which would wrongly lead to conclusions about unstable party identification.15 While the impact of short-
term forces on party identification might indeed be apparent, this does not exclude the possibility of 
analyzing the long-term trend of party identification. It is important in this regard, however, to allow for a 
distinction between times of election campaigns, when citizens are intensively exposed to all kinds of 
political information and ‘normal’ periods, when we assume political communication to be much less 
intensive. 
As most European election studies are largely inspired by the work of these U.S. trendsetters, the concept 
of party identification was transferred to Europe. Skepticism about the applicability of partisanship in 
European voting research arose in several countries, most notably in the Netherlands.16 Thomassen and 
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Rosema17 showed quite convincingly that party identification and vote choices were correlated too 
strongly to allow for disentangling both in the Netherlands. To explain the stability of voting behavior in 
European multiparty systems, European scholars more often stressed the importance of cleavages in 
society. European voters were expected to vote according to their social background, with membership of 
religious groups and social classes as important determinants. Because of the impact of these long-term 
stable attitudes for the vote choice in European societies, European party systems were considered to be  
frozen.18 
Despite the criticism that has been formulated against the use of the concept of partisanship within a 
European context, other authors have argued in favor of the concept within multiparty-systems as well.19 
With regard to Germany, partisanship is considered a valid concept and therefore it often has been 
investigated within the German electoral context.20 Since the 1970s, several German election studies and 
questionnaires have aimed to measure partisanship in Germany by means of a question echoing the 
standard U.S. question of party identification.21 This long tradition of asking for party identification allows 
to sketch a long-term trend of partisanship within the country. In the first decades after the foundation of 
the German Federal Republic, ever more voters had strong party identifications and felt attached to a 
particular political party. By the end of the 1970s, this upward trend was reversed in the West German 
Länder. Similar to what is found in the United States, scholars found that the proportion of citizens with a 
party identification declined, while the share of independents in the electorate increased. The phenomenon 
of party dealignment could thus be discerned in Germany as well.22 This decrease of partisanship among 
the West German electorate is not found to arise from a sudden shock, but proceeds slowly and 
constantly.23 In the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), with almost 20 percent of the voters, the 
share of non-partisans in the electorate is even larger than in the West of Germany.24 This high number of 
citizens without a party identification is interpreted differently in both parts of the country, however. In 
the West, the gradual decline of the percentage of partisans indicates that dealignment causes the absence 
of strong party identifications within the electorate. The Eastern part of the country, on the other hand, is 
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considered a pre-alignment electorate, because of the short period of stable democracy.25 Most previous 
research on partisanship in Germany has focused on the more homogeneous Western electorate only.26 In 
this paper, however, we explicitly incorporate citizens from both the East and West and we aim at 
explaining different levels and trends in partisanship in both groups. 
b. Theoretical Explanations for Declining Partisanship 
When it comes to explaining the downward trend in partisanship in Germany, several causal mechanism 
have been formulated. Because of the gradual decline of party identification within Germany, references 
are made to dealignment trends throughout the Western industrialized world.27 Therefore, the causes of  
the decline in partisanship are largely similar to what is mentioned for other countries facing a downward 
trend in the proportion of party identifiers. In several contributions and articles Dalton analyses 
dealignment in Germany and investigates the reasons for it. His main argument is similar to what he 
indicates as of foremost importance for dealignment in the United States as well. Dalton stresses the  link 
between a gradual decline of partisanship in society and a simultaneous process of cognitive mobilization. 
Cognitive mobilization theory assumes that citizens now have both the skills and the resources to be much 
better informed voters compared to some decades ago. This is due to rising levels of education on the one 
hand and a media revolution on the other hand. Because those informed voters no longer have to rely on 
partisanship as a short-cut when casting a vote, the number of apartisans in the electorate increases. These 
apartisans are politically sophisticated, but also politically independent.28 Other authors acknowledge that 
at an aggregate level, the process of cognitive mobilization is associated with higher levels of 
apartisanship. At an individual level, however, the higher educated among the youngest and cognitively 
mobilized generations are found to be strong partisans.29 As such, analyses of cross-sectional data leave a 
puzzle of aggregate trends not being reflected in data at the individual level. 
Similar to analyses made in other advanced industrial countries, scholars have specific attention for the 
role of cleavage structures and class voting when studying dealignment in Germany. In the 1950s and 
1960s voters in the Federal German Republic predominantly endorsed the traditional parties CDU/CSU 
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and SPD. They did so because the social groups they belonged to were of foremost importance and clearly 
aligned to the traditional political parties.30 Social cleavages therefore resulted in quite stable party 
identifications, with church-goers identifying with CDU/CSU and blue-collar workers being SPD-
partisans. Due to secularization and the expansion of the middle class, however, the traditional groups in 
society are shrinking in size. Furthermore, social-class voting has lost most of its importance.31 Therefore, 
while social cleavages once were seen as stabilizing partisanship and freezing the party system, they are 
no longer believed to fulfill this role anymore. Other scholars have tried to counter these arguments and 
they stress that although the numbers of manual workers and church-goers has sharply declined, these 
social cleavages still shape electoral behavior in Germany.32  
In the Western part of Germany the trend toward dealignment was already noticed in the 1970s and 1980s. 
For voters in the Eastern part of the country, the 1990 unification elections were a first introduction into a 
multiparty-context largely dominated by Socialists and Christian-democrats.33 Because they had not been 
exposed to party politics in a multiparty system before, researchers expected and found East German 
voters to be partisans less often and to have a more fluid party identification.34 After unification then, as 
East Germans’ experience with the party system would further develop, their party identification was 
expected to strengthen. Due to the context of gradual dealignment in the Western part of the country, 
however, Dalton35 foresaw a rather slow process of stabilizing party attachments. With regard to voting 
behavior in West Germany, then, it is now clear that unification accelerated the decline of class voting and 
dealignment already apparent in the West before 1990.36 A review of the literature on electoral behavior 
and politics in Germany makes clear that when analyzing long-term trends distinguishing between East 
and West is a necessary precondition.37 
Electoral and political change is a process that appears to proceed very gradually and slowly. For this 
reason, generational replacement is mostly seen as the mechanism causing the shifts that are apparent on 
an aggregate level.38 For dealignment too, scholars stress the impact of the entrance of new generations 
into the electorate to explain this process.39 For Germany as well, the declining importance of partisanship 
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is attributed to the new generations entering the political arena.40 According to the logic of Dalton, it are 
the newer generations that are expected to be affected most strongly by the process of cognitive 
mobilization. Traditional groups and cleavages in society are of less importance for the youngest 
generations as well. Furthermore, the mechanism of early socialization and the inheritance of parents’ 
party identification too, might explain why generation after generation, the number of partisans decreases 
once the trend has started.  
While statements about a dealignment trend and of the process of generational replacement are abundant, 
there are not all that much studies showing empirical evidence that these processes actually occur in 
Western democracies. This is mainly a consequence of the data used to describe and analyze dealignment. 
Most researchers use cross-sectional data to illustrate differences over time and between generations.41 In 
order to offer convincing evidence for the claim that the entrance of new generations is of foremost 
importance for the dealignment trend, however, what is needed is a thorough analysis of longitudinal 
panel data, focusing on the occurrence of age, period and cohort effects.  
c. Hypotheses 
The theoretical framework sheds light on some expectations about which citizens are expected to be 
apartisans. Furthermore, some hints are given concerning when people are expected to give up their party 
identification. 
According to Dalton’s cognitive mobilization theory, we expect that citizens with high levels of political 
sophistication will be party identifiers less often.42 It has to be noted, however, that Albright43 argues for 
the other relation: the higher the level of political sophistication, the more likely citizens will have a strong 
party identity and preference. Arzheimer44, too, finds a positive relation between political sophistication 
and partisan identity. Neverthless, in line with most of the dealignment literature, we assume the 
occurrence of a negative relation between political sophistication and partisanship, as is predicted in most 
of the work of Dalton. Therefore we expect both a high level of interest in politics and higher levels of 
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education to be negatively associated with levels of partisanship. Furthermore, focusing on a European 
country, we expect a profound impact of class cleavages on partisanship as well. Similar to the traditional 
literature on the impact of social groups on party identification, we argue that those citizens with firmly 
entrenched memberships of traditional groups in society are party identifiers more often. We therefore 
expect those citizens without a religious denomination and belonging to the middle class to have higher 
chances of being an apartisan.45 Respondents that are socially embedded, such as church-goers or 
members of trade unions on the other hand, are expected to be strong partisans.46 Because men are 
expected to be more interested and involved in politics, we also control for the effect of gender on 
partisanship.47 Furthermore, the history and specific constellation of the German political system leads us 
to include the difference between former inhabitants of East and West Germany into account. Those 
citizens that used to live in the GDR and their descendants are expected to have smaller chances of being a 
partisan.  
The unique longitudinal panel we use for the analyses allows to disentangle different time-related 
variables and their alleged impact on dealignment. First, we take into account the effect of ageing on 
partisanship. A large body of literature, among which The American Voter is one of the most influential 
examples, argues that party identification stabilizes as citizens get older. According to the aging-stability 
hypothesis citizens’ partisanship stabilizes year after year due to the electoral experience voters acquire 
over their life-time and election after election.48 Proponents of the life-cycle hypothesis, furthermore, 
assume that toward the end of the life cycle, citizens become susceptible to change again.49 Therefore, we 
investigate both the effect of age and age squared on respondents’ likelihood of reporting partisanship. A 
second set of time-related variables should take into account the secular decline of partisanship over time 
and an increase in the number of party identifiers when elections are close.50 While we can expect sudden 
changes during campaign periods, we are mostly interested in the long term trends with regard to party 
identification. 
3. Data and Methods 
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These hypotheses will be tested using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a longitudinal cross-
sectional time series or unbalanced panel study which has only rarely been used by political scientists.51 It 
is representative for the population of Germany at each wave, by using frequent refreshment samples.52  
Only panel data can provide insights on change over time at the individual level. Despite the fact that 
repeated cross-sectional data are better suited for estimating the effects of age, periods and cohorts at the 
same time, only a panel structure allows to make statements about the effects of aging.53 Such panel data 
should span a long period of time to allow for life cycle effects on the one hand  and period effects on the 
other hand to become apparent.54 The SOEP data used in our analyses meet these criteria and provide as 
such a unique opportunity to investigate age and period effects on the evolution of party identification. 
The German Socio Economic Panel Study (SOEP) is one of the very few datasets that allows for such an 
analysis. These annual surveys were carried out from 1984 in West-Germany and included inhabitants of 
the former German Democratic Republic in the sample from 1990 onwards. Although previous research 
did make use of this unique dataset to investigate partisanship and dealignment, as far as we know, 
scholars have not taken full advantage of the panel data to disentangle age, period and cohort effects 
before.55  
A first question that will be tackled is the variation over time in party identification. This variation can be 
seen as the outcome of three distinct but interrelated effects: age, period, or generation.56 Age, or the 
passing of time for an individual since his year of birth, could have an effect on party identification in the 
sense that older people identify more with a party than young people. A period effect means that there is 
an influence of the time at which the question was posed. Generational or cohort effects mean that the 
formative period of an individual has a lasting influence on his behaviour through time. Although these 
three phenomena have a distinct meaning, in practice it is impossible to distinguish between them, as there 
is a linear dependence between them. Age is the period minus the cohort. Distinguishing age, period and 
cohort has caused a vigorous debate in the social sciences, with a number of possibilities to investigate the 
different effects.  
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The first possibility is to investigate only two of the three effects, and omitting or controlling for the third, 
smallest effect.57 A second possibility is constraining some parameters in the model, and testing different 
models with different constraints.58 This mechanical solution has been shown to give unreliable and hard 
to interpret estimates, and they do not always correctly identify significant interactions or non-lineair 
effects.59 The third and most elegant solution is to replaces at least one of the time variables with a proxy 
measuring an underlying mechanism responsible for the effects. This last option presupposes that the 
influence of each effect on the problem at hand is clear, and that these proxy data are at hand.60 
In our analysis, we chose for the first option. Not only is this a methodologically sound option that allows 
us to fully investigate our data, it also allows us to investigate the non-linearity of two time-effects and 
their interactions. Furthermore, as we are using longitudinal data, it allows us to investigate better age and 
period effects, than when using a cross-sectional study. 
As we want to investigate party identification, and look into differences over time between inhabitants of 
East and West Germany, we are limited to observations since 1992. Only from that year onwards the 
question on party identification has been posed to both East and West Germans. A time frame from 1992 
to 2009 includes 18 yearly observations, which allows us to arrive at reliable and stable conclusions 
regarding the influence of time on party identification. To improve the reliability of our analysis regarding 
age effects, we further limit the panel study to respondents between 18 and 80 years old. Moreover, since 
in Germany voting age is at 18, only from that year onwards we expect respondents to acquire a strong 
sense of party identification. As such we are analyzing 258,225 observations of in total 30,988 individuals. 
On average we have eight observations for each person, with a minimum of one and a maximum of 
eighteen.  
In the following paragraphs we will first present the variables used in this analysis, and subsequently we 
provide a description of the evolution of party identification over time. After investigating the presence of 
age, period and cohort effects, we will analyze party identification from a longitudinal perspective by 
using multilevel techniques. 
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Dependent variable: Party identification 
What exactly we call party identification is of major importance for this analysis. We refer to party 
identification in general, without focusing on specific parties. This definition of party identification is 
motivated both by practical and theoretical reasons. First, a practical reason is that we are constrained by 
the way the data were collected. The question included in the SOEP-questionnaire is framed in such a way 
to ask whether a respondent identifies with a party, without asking for the name of the specific party. The 
English translation of the question is as follows: “Many people in Germany are inclined to a certain 
political party, although from time to time they vote for another political party. What about you? Are you 
inclined – generally speaking – to a particular party?” Only if the respondent answers in an affirmative 
manner on this question, the precise party is asked for. In this analysis we will not analyze party specific 
identification, which has already been done before with regard to the German case.61 Rather, we will look 
at the question of party identification in general because we assume this is most strongly expressing the 
attitudinal linkage between voters and the party system as a whole. A second and more theoretical reason 
for analyzing party identification in general is that our aim is to investigate broader societal trends. This 
approach to party identification allows us to test to what extent citizens have the feeling that their interests 
are being represented by the party system. This closeness to a particular party is contrasted to an 
indifference towards politics in general. As such we focus more on the relation between citizens and the 
party system in general, and not on the relation between parties and their supporters.62  
Within the scholarly literature, partisanship is often used as a thermometer of dealignment in society. 
Authors present a trend of growing dealignment and increasing numbers of apartisans in Western 
industrialized democracies.63 Therefore, if there is indeed a trend of growing dealignment in Germany, 
this should also be apparent in levels of net electoral volatility. In order to assess whether the evolution of 
net volatility in Germany indeed hints towards a fundamental shift in levels of party identifiers, we plot 
volatility in Germany over time. In Figure 1  the Pedersen Index of electoral volatility between 1953 and 
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2009 is presented. Although this is a crude measurement, the Pedersen Index is the most often used 
indicator for investigating electoral volatility on an aggregate level.64 
As is clear from Figure 1, net volatility declined between 1953 and 1992, but we can observe a strong 
increase in levels of net volatility in Germany over the last two decades. Noteworthy is the sudden rise of 
volatility after 2002, which is mainly due to major vote shifts in West Germany. In the Eastern part of the 
country, on the other hand, levels of volatility were initially high and have stabilized somewhat 
afterwards. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Independent variables 
Our aim is to disentangle age, period and cohort effects on party identification trends. Two important 
factors of interest are age and survey year. We include the quadratic term of each variable, to investigate 
nonlinear effects on party identification. A third time-related variable is a respondents’ generation, which 
is coded as a period of ten years, based on the year of birth. Gender is included as a background variable.  
Respondents’ educational level is expected to have an important influence on party identification. We 
recoded education in three dummy variables: low education means that the respondent did have a degree 
of higher secondary education; the reference category is middle education which equals a finished high 
school degree; higher education means the respondent achieved a tertiary degree.  
To distinguish inhabitants of the former GDR from those living in the western Länder, the living location 
in 1989 is used. Since religious affiliation is a characteristic that can change over time, but is not measured 
in each wave, we coded the variable in each wave according to the religious affiliation mentioned in the 
closest year available. Being a member of a trade union was coded in the same way, as this was not 
questioned every year either. 
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Political interest is a single item, with 4 answering categories ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’. The 
variable election year is coded here as the observation closest to actual elections. As the fieldwork of the 
survey mostly takes place in the first months of the year, this means it is actually the year after the 
elections.  
The descriptive statistics of the independent variables are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 258,225 46.49 15.94 18 80 
Survey Year 258,225 2001.59 5.02 1992 2009 
Educational level 
     Low 258,225 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Middle 258,225 0.37 0.48 0 1 
High 258,225 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Living in the GDR in 1989  258,225 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Member of trade union 258,225 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Religious affiliation 
     Catholic 258,225 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Protestant 258,225 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Other or non denominational 258,225 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Political interest 258,225 2.27 0.81 1 4 
Election year 258,225 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Data: Soep 1992-2009. 
Analysis 
A first feel of the time effects can be developed by looking at some data visualizations.  We can have 
some insight into the period effects by mapping the average percentage of party identifiers in the 
population each year using weights to correct for sample imbalances. These weights ensure each separate 
survey year is representative for the German population. Furthermore, we distinguish between the trends 
in Germany as a whole and in West and East separately. 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of party identification over time. It is clear that over time, there is a slight 
decline in party identification. Inhabitants from the former GDR significantly less often have a party 
identification compared to inhabitants of West Germany. The electoral cycle has a clear influence on party 
identification, as identification peaks in the observation closest to a year with national elections. This 
illustrates the mobilizing effect of elections As the 1999 level of party identification was never achieved 
afterwards, it is nevertheless very likely that there is a structural trend behind the year to year decline.  
To investigate the magnitude of age, period or cohort, Yang suggests using graphical representations. In 
case the mean curve over age by generation shows a distinct profile, cohort effects are substantial.65 Figure 
3 illustrates that generational effects do not play a large role in the decline of party identification in 
Germany, as the mean party identification level for each age group by generation largely exhibits the same 
pattern. A preliminary statistical analysis with a multilevel model only including age, period and cohort 
effects points to the same results. As such we assume that age and period are responsible for the largest 
effects on party identification. Despite the fact that in quite some of the literature the existence of cohort 
effects is assumed, these are not obvious in the current dataset. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
A more thorough analysis of the evolution of party identification can be achieved by using multilevel 
logistic models, with observations nested within persons, as this is a panel study. Multilevel or random 
effect models make it possible to separate the variance in two levels, so that it is clear what part of the 
change depends on variation in time within one person and what part depends on time-invariant 
differences between persons.66 Our analysis uses a random intercept model, which means that we allow 
different starting points for each individual. In a first step, the null model is estimated. This model 
separates the variance in a period dependent part and a person dependent part. The proportion of variance 
depending on the higher level, in this case the person, is shown in the intra class correlation coefficient 
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(ICC), or rho, In a second step information is added to the model. To investigate the evolution of the 
influence of variables over time, interactions between survey year and each variable are included in the 
last step. As the coefficients of logistic models are difficult to interpret, the odds ratios are reported instead 
of the exponentiated coefficients. An odds ratio higher than one means a positive effect, while an odds 
ratio lower than one is a negative effect. 
Table 2: Multilevel Logistic regression of Party identification (1992-2009) 
 Null model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  OR (SE) Sig. OR (SE) Sig. OR (SE) Sig. 
Age  1.05(.001)*** 1.05 (.001)*** 1.03(.001)*** 
Age²  1.00(.000)*** 1.00 (.000)*** 1.00(.000)** 
Survey year  0.95(.002)*** 0.95 (.004) *** 0.96(.006)*** 
Survey year²  1.00(.000)*** 1.00(.000) *** 1.00(.000)*** 
Age*Survey year   1.00 (.000)* 1.00(.000)ns 
Male 
(Ref. Female) 
 
2.00(.071)*** 2.01(.072) *** 
 
1.27(.042)*** 
Male*Survey year   1.00(.003)ns 1.00(.003)ns 
Education 
(Ref. Finished High school) 
Low 
High 
  
 
0.44(.015)*** 
2.26(.090)*** 
 
 
0.43(.015)*** 
2.16(.088)*** 
 
 
0.36(.025)*** 
3.11 (.298)*** 
Low*Survey year 
High*Survey year  
  0.98(.004)*** 
1.01(.004)** 
0.98(.004)*** 
1.02(.005)*** 
Lived in GDR in 1989  0.32(.014)*** 0.33(.014)*** 0.36 (.015)*** 
Lived in GDR in 1989*Survey 
year 
  1.01(.004) * 1.01(.004)* 
Religious affiliation 
(Ref.: Other or non 
denominational) 
Catholic 
Protestant 
  
 
 
1.51(.058)*** 
1.63(.053)*** 
 
 
 
1.50(.058)*** 
1.64(.053)*** 
 
 
 
1.51(.056)*** 
1.55(.049)*** 
Catholic*Survey year 
Prostestant*Survey year 
  1.03 (.004)*** 
1.01 (.004) ns 
1.02(.004)*** 
1.01(.004)ns 
Member of Trade Union  1.30(.037)*** 1.28(.037)*** 1.25(.037)*** 
Trade union member* Survey 
year 
  0.99 (.004) ** 0.99(.004)** 
Election Year  1.45(.021)*** 1.45(.021) *** 1.40(.021)*** 
Political Interest    3.54(.071)*** 
Political Interest*Survey year    1.00(.002)ns 
Political Interest*Low education    1.26(.034)*** 
Political Interest*High education    0.78(.027)*** 
Log-likelihood -151530.22 -118859.72 -118796.95 -112651.89 
Pseudo-R²  0.2156 0.2160 0.2566 
Rho .7194 .6898 .6899 .6408 
Note: Data: Soep 1992-2009, N=258,225. Coefficients are odds ratios. Sig.: ***< .001 , **<.01, *<=.05, ns>.05 
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The null model, not including any information, shows that 72 percent can be attributed to differences 
between persons, while 28 percent depends on change within the same person over time.In practice this 
means a large share of the respondents switched from not having a party identification to having one, or 
vice versa, in the period from 1992 to 2009. The fact that the majority of the variance is still on the person 
level, justifies our random effects approach. It shows that differences between persons are more 
pronounced than differences over time of the same person.   
In Model 1, which includes all the main effects, except for political interest, the most important socio-
demographic determinants for party identification are shown to be age, gender, education and living in the 
former GDR. Older, higher educated or male respondents and those living in the West, have a very large 
probability of having a party identification. The age effect has an inverted U-shape, showing that party 
identification rises relatively fast over the first part of the life cycle, remains relatively stable in later life, 
and diminishes slightly in old age. Being Catholic, Protestant or a trade union member also heightens the 
level of party identification. A separate analysis was conducted for inhabitants of the East and West of 
Germany respectively. Except for the age-effect not being quadratic but linear for inhabitants of the 
former GDR, all the found associations have similar strength and go in the same direction and therefore 
there is no need to further differentiate between the two parts of the country. These effects largely confirm 
our hypotheses, but the size of these associations is remarkable. In contrast to Dalton’s argument, party 
identification is clearly higher among the classically privileged social groups: older citizens, men and the 
highly educated. Compared to a women who finished high school, a higher educated man has a party 
affiliation about four times more often. If the women additionally was from the former GDR, while the 
man lived in the West, he will have a party affiliation 12 times more often.The strong explanation of 
social background is further shown by the fact that this simple model accounts for about 20 percent of the 
total variation. This illustrates the fact that social structure and engagement in civil society still has a large 
influence on party identification, in contrast to arguments about the decline of party affiliation. 
Controlling for all these variables, a time trend can also be discerned: over time, fewer Germans have a 
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party identification, although elections give a temporary boost to party affiliation. This effect, however, 
remains limited to the year of the election and does not change the long term declining trend. The fact that 
the quadratic term of the survey year is significant and negative, means that it is shaped like an inverted U, 
and that this process is becoming more intense than at the start of the observation period. 
In Model 2, interactions with survey year are included to investigate to what extent the influence of these 
socio demographic variables changes over time. Especially the influence of a respondent’s educational 
level is increasing over time. Being a Catholic also has a stronger influence over time, while being a 
member of a trade union is losing its effect. There is also a slight increase of the effect of age over time. 
To summarize it , we can conclude that in general the gap between those having a party affiliation and 
those without is growing over time, and the role of social background is increasing rather than 
diminishing. East and West on the other hand, are growing closer to each other. It has to be noted that this 
is especially the case because the levels of party affiliation among citizens in the West are dropping, and 
not because they are rising among inhabitants of the former GDR. Although adding the interaction with 
period illustrated some interesting tendencies, they do not contribute much to the substantial explanation, 
which is illustrated by a very small rise in explanained variance. 
In Model 3 we include political interest and its interactions with survey year and education. Contrary to 
Dalton’s expectation, mainly the politically interested have a party affiliation.  The interactions between 
political interest and educational level are also meaningful, and they further strengthen the main effects of 
eduction level. In practice the interactions mean that political interest has a large effect on party affiliation 
among the lower educated, and a smaller effect among the higher educated. Nevertheless the strong 
baseline effects of both political interest and education show clearly that party affiliation is more prevalent 
among highly educated, and politically interested, which are often the same groups in society.  
Furthermore, although political interest does absorb some of the effects of educational level and gender, 
the previously found associations remain statistically significant and theoretically meaningful.  
4. Discussion 
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We started this article from the analysis that party identification is in decline in Germany, and that this 
represents a form of alienation from the political system in general, and more specifically toward the party 
system. Based mostly on the writings of Dalton, our assumption was therefore that the loss of party 
identity would be concentrated among the politically sophisticated. In order to disentangle age, period and 
cohort effects, we relied on 18 panel waves with a total of some 258,000 observations. 
This investigation into the evolution of party identification in Germany leads to a number of clear 
conclusions. First, birth cohorts do not seem to play a significant role in the ongoing decline of party 
identification. Basically we find the same patterns for all cohorts, so contrary to expectations a relatively 
straightforward process of generational replacement apparently is not the main cause for the decline of 
party identification in Germany. Second, the decline witnessed by Arzheimer67 is still ongoing, and is 
mainly due to negative period effects. Although the erosion seems to slow down, the downward trend is 
still apparent and this suggests a growing level of party dealignment throughout German society. 
Our findings furthermore suggest that the stratification between those with a party identification, and those 
without is becoming more outspoken during the observation period. We already knew from previous 
research that party membership is more prevalent among men, older citizens, and those with a high socio-
economic status. The current analysis suggests that this is also the case for party identification. What is 
more surprising, however, is that these differences have grown during the observation period in a 
significant manner. This means that those with a party identity are even less representative of the 
population as a whole in 2009 than they were in 1992. Inequalities in this regard have only become 
stronger. 
There are four major consequences arising from this conclusion. First it can be expected that the further 
decline in party identification will have consequences for the study of the determinants of electoral 
behaviour. Finding that the earlier described trend of decreasing partisanship in Germany has continued 
since the 1990s has implications with regard to research on voting behavior. Although the concept of party 
identification has been disputed within a European context, within Germany partisanship has been 
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considered an important element in the vote choice process. As such, party ID is traditionally included in 
voter surveys and is applied within models of voting behavior. The results of the current analysis, 
however, suggesting that party identification continues to decrease throughout the electorate imply the 
need for a reconsideration of models of voting behavior within Germany as well. The group of party 
identifiers further diminishes and this group seems to be increasingly less representative for the electorate 
at large. Therefore partisanship might become increasingly less relevant as an explanatory variable for 
election results in Gemany, short-term factors should probably be looked at to explain vote choices. 
The secondconsideration is theoretically relevant. Dalton has argued that party dealignment is a matter of 
political sophistication: those who are politically interested and knowledgeable do not need the heuristic 
short cut of a party identity anymore to be able to form an opinion on political matters. This analysis in 
fact suggests the exact opposite: those with high levels of education and political interest (the two most 
obvious indicators for political sophistication) actually are more likely to report a party identity in 2009 
than in 1992. Contrary to the expectation of Dalton, party identity does remain strongest among the 
politically sophisticated, although it has to be mentioned that the effect of political interest is even stronger 
among those with low levels of education. So the loss of party identity is concentrated among those 
without political interest and relatively low education levels. This means we do not observe the rise of a 
new generation of critical, independent and knowledgeable citizens, but rather the gradual alienation of a 
large part of the population from the party system. Further analysis will have to determine why our results 
differ from the ones presented by Dalton.68 Most notably, not only the period under investigation is 
different for the two studies, it also has to be noted that while Dalton relies on repeated cross-sectional 
observations we fully exploit the panel data that are available, and this too might lead to different results. 
This brings us to the third consequence, that deals with matters of democratic responsiveness and 
representativeness. Political parties traditionally served as the main linkage mechanism between citizens 
and the political system. We already knew that party membership, and to a lesser extent, also party 
identification were unequally distributed within society. But this stratification has become much stronger 
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during the observation period. This implies that political parties more and more turn to political enclaves, 
and we can no longer take for granted that they actually are linked with the mainstream population of a 
country. If only the higher educated and the politically interested still identify with a political party, how 
can we expect that parties still maintain a high level of connectedness with society as a whole? 
Fourth, those still having a party identification tend to be the higher educated, those who are integrated in 
society via religious affiliation or trade union membership, and those with an interest in politics. Whiteley 
already expressed his concern about the fact that party members have become more and more distinct 
from the population as a whole, and his fear is that this will imply that parties are less able to represent the 
population.69 What the current analysis demonstrates is that this process does not just occur with regard to 
membership, but also with regard to the broader indicator of party identity. As such, the lack of 
connectedness depicted so vividly by Whitely, might even be stronger than was originally suggested. 
Political parties not only lose members, they also lose citizens who are still able to identify with their party 
project. 
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Figure 1. Pedersen Index of electoral volatility for German legislative elections (1994-2009) 
 
Pedersen Index in general elections, own calculations. Net volatility is calculated separately for Germany as a whole, 
for the Länder of the former GDR and for the Länder of West-Germany to which we also add the results for Berlin. 
Source for election results: www.bundeswahlleiter.de/
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Figure 2. Pedersen Index of electoral volatility for German Landestagelections (1990-2009) 
 
Pedersen Index in Landestagelections, own calculations. Net volatility is calculated separately for Germany as a 
whole, for the Länder of the former GDR and for the Länder of West-Germany to which we also add the results for 
Berlin. Source for election results : www.bundeswahlleiter.de/
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Figure 3. Evolution of Party Identification by being a former inhabitant of East- or West-Germany 
(1992-2009) 
 
 Source: SOEP 1992-2009, own calculations 
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Figure 4. Average Party Identification for each age group by birth cohort (N=258,225) 
 
 Data: SOEP 1992-2009. Scatterplots of proportion of the age cohort reporting a party identification according to 
age.  
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